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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

RIGHT OF INFANT TO SUE TO RECOVER
BACK MONEY PAID UNDER A CONTRACT SUBSEQUENTLY AVOIDED
(Owing to the importance of the subject matter and the state of the law
in relation thereto, we feel that the opinion below by one of the state's
ablest circuit judges should be published in full.-ErroR)

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN CIRCUIT COURT

FOR LINCOLN COUNTY
WILLIAM DURANsO,

Opinion on Demurrer
by

Guardian,
Plaintiff,
vs.

J. A. FiTzGERAm,
et a!.,
Defendants.
The plaintiff, an infant, sues to recover back money paid upon
the purchase price of an automobile which he had in his possession
from March 17, 1920, to about October I, i92I, and which he
then returned to the defendants upon disaffirming his contract
of purchase. The defendants answer that during the time when
plaintiff was in possession of the automobile there was a large
depreciation, first, upon account of fall of prices of automobiles,
and second, upon account of the use of the automobile by plaintiff, and that such depreciation in value exceeds the amount
paid. Defendants also allege that the value of the use of the
automobile to the plaintiff was greater than the amount paid.
To this defense the plaintiff has demurred. The decision of
the issues in this case will necessitate the application of a rule
which has not been settled in Wisconsin.
Plaintiff claims simply that he bought an automobile; that he
paid money upon account of it; that he returned it and disaffirmed
the contract and is therefore entitled to his money back. Defendant in effect retorts that plaintiff has had value received
for his money, and that he has injured the automobile in question
to the full extent of the money paid.
The purpose of the purchase of the automobile, and the use
to which it was put, and the station in life of the plaintiff,
do not appear. The court is asked to judge upon the meager
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statement appearing in the pleadings that the automobile was
not a necessary to the plaintiff, and that not being a necessary
he could, under no circumstances, be held liable, either for
injury to the automobile or the value of its use to him, so long
as he disaffirmed the contract and returned the automobile in such
form as he had it.
While the Wisconsin Court has in a number of cases dealt
with the rights of an infant to disaffirm and be protected in such
disaffirmance of his contract, no case has been found which
solves our problem here. The courts of other states are in
hopeless conflict on the question. Such conflict is well illustrated
by the following from Pettit v. Liston, I9i Pac. 66o:
Many courts have held broadly that a minor may so purchase property
and keep it for an indefinite time, if he chooses, until it is worn out and
destroyed, and then recover the payments made on the purchase price,
without allowing the seller anything whatever for the use and depreciation
.of the property.
Many other authorities hold that where the transaction is fair and
reasonable, and the minor was not overcharged or taken advantage of in
any way, and he takes and keeps the property and uses or destroys it, he
cannot recover the payments made on the purchase price, without allowing
the seller for the wear and tear and depreciation of the article while in his
hands.
The plaintiff contends for the former rule, and supports his contention

with citations from the courts of last resort of Maine, Connecticut, Indiana, Massachusetts, Vermont, Nebraska, Virginia, Iowa, Mississippi, and
West Virginia, most of which, although not all, support his contention. On
the contrary, the courts of New York, Maryland, Montana, Illinois, Ken-

tucky, New Hampshire, and Minnesota, with some others, support the
latter rule, which seems to be also the English rule.

I have examined with care a large number of these authorities.
The decisions in some states are based upon statutes, and are
therefore not here applicable. Wisconsin has no statutes on the
subject. Where, however, there are no statutes, the courts are
still hopelessly in conflict.
The right of a minor to disaffirm a contract is, of course,
recognized by all courts. He is to be protected because of his
infancy, from dissipation of his estate through improvident contracts. His contracts which are not for necessaries are not
void but voidable, and because they are voidable just conditions
must attach to his right to void them. As stated by Kent:
"The privilege of infaficy is to be used as a shield, and not as
a sword."
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An infant can not be permitted to use his privilege for the
purpose of perpetrating a fraud upon another and reaping the
advantage. He is not to be assisted by the law in becoming a
pirate, immune to punishment. Innumerable situations may
arise wherein it would be shocking to one's sense of justice to
permit an infant to disaffirm a contract and recover back what
he had paid. If an infant were to buy a piece of personal
property and pay for it, and thereupon sell it for as much as
he paid for it, and with his money in his pocket should sue to
recover back what he had paid, it is hard to see how he could
be permitted to recover. If he were to willfully destroy it instead
of selling it, it would seem unjust for him to recover the purchase
price. If an infant, seeking his own pleasure and not in the
pursuit of necessaries, should spend his means for theater tickets
and railroad rides, and for any other of the thousand of things
which he might spend his money for, other than necessaries,
and after having enjoyed the theater, or railway journey, or any
other pleasure which he purchased, and which he could not return, should then demand back his money, it would be rather
shocking to think that he could recover it. If such would be
the rule then confectioners, theater owners, railways and tradesmen generally would be forced to refuse any traffic with minors.
Perhaps the majority of all bicycles now purchased are purchased by minors. If each minor may wear out his bicycle
after having paid for it, and then return the junk and recover
back his money, tradesmen ought to be advised. The cases of
Rice v. Butler, (N. Y.) 55 N. E. 275; Pettitvi. Liston, (Oregon)
191 Pac. 66o; Berglund v. Co., (Minn.) i6o N. W. 192; Stanhope
v. Shambow, (Mont.) 170 Pac. 752, and other cases repudiate
such a rule, but there are an equal number of cases which would
sustain it.
It does not seem to this court that such a rule is in consonance
with justice and good conscience. It may be difficult to apply
Chancellor Kent's rule that the privilege of infancy must be
used as a shield and not as a sword, but that rule appeals to this
court as the one that should be attempted to be applied.
In case of a contract which from its very nature tends to
waste an infant's estate, an infant should be fully protected against
suffering such waste and should be restored as near as may be
to his former position. On the other hand an infant should not
be permitted to profit by his privilege of infancy. Neither

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

should he be permitted, in case of purchase of an article of value
to him in a business in which he is engaged, and after having
used it and obtained much benefit therefrom, to return it and
recover back all he paid for it.
Looking at the pleadings in this case in the light of these
principles, it seems that the demurrer to the answer must be
overruled. It may be, for aught that appears in the pleadings,
that the plaintiff purchased the automobile for use in his business as a busman, or for some other use in which he greatly
profited; or as alleged in the answer, the value of the use of the
automobile to the plaintiff may have been greater than the amount
paid; or may have been equal to a considerable sum, which the
defendants ought not to be required to repay. It does not appear
by the answer that the facts stated therein state any defense.
The extent to which plaintiff must go by way restoring to defendants the consideration he received before he can recover
anything must depend upon the facts in detail which may be
brought out on the trial. It may even appear that an automobile was a necessary to the plaintiff.
For the foregoing reasons the demurrer will be overruled.
A. H. REID,
Judge.
Dated February 2, i922.

